INTRODUCTION
A great deal has been written about the integration of physicians and hospital systems. Much of this literature has focused on the structural vehicles--such as physician hospital organizations (PHOs)--that have been developed to enable both parties to jointly contract with managed care payors (Burns and Thorpe 1993; Cave 1995; Conrad and Shortell 1996) .
There is mixed evidence regarding the outcomes of integration efforts (for a recent review see Burns, Shortell, and Andersen 1998) . Evidence suggests that these structural vehicles have not been successful in obtaining managed care contracts or covered lives (InterStudy 1997) and are not primarily targeted at reducing costs or improving outcomes (Ernst & Young 1995) . The Health Systems Integration Study (HSIS) has reported mixed evidence regarding the effect of (a) functional and physician integration on clinical integration, and (b) overall system integration on system financial performance Shortell, Gillies, and Anderson 1994) .
Such findings suggest that it may be more appropriate (at least in the near term) to focus on the processes of integration that may be antecedent to outcomes. Such a focus is consistent with the structure-process-outcome model articulated earlier by Donabedian (1966) . A study sponsored by the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC 1993; Bray et al. 1994) suggests that the quality of the work relationships between physicians and hospitals helps to explain why some hospitals make profits under Medicare while others sustain losses. Trust, communication, and decision-making participation were considered to be more important for hospital profitability than the presence of contracting vehicles such as PHOs. Indeed, several recent analyses of PHOs have concluded that these contracting vehicles are empty shells with little managed care infrastructure--that is, structures without process (Michigan State Medical Society 1994; Ernst & Young 1995; Burns and Thorpe 1997) . A recent comparative case analysis of integrated systems by the Center for Health Management Research (CHMR) similarly concluded that processes of trust, physician participation in governance and management, and leadership development are critical for integration success (Zuckerman et al. 1998 ).
In a similar vein, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1995; 1997) argue that top management should refocus their attention from structures to processes. Their suggestion is based on an analysis of global-matrix firms such as Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), a $30 billion electrical engineering firm that (until recently) employed 65,000 workers in 1,300 separate operating companies in 140 different countries (Taylor 1991; Simons and Bartlett 1992; Kets de Vries 1994) . Within ABB, each of the 1,300 operating company presidents reports to both a global business head (global responsibility for product line) and a regional country coordinator (local responsibility for geographical line)--hence the global-matrix firm. The challenge facing such firms is to balance the simultaneous needs for product standardization with geographic localization. That is, how can firms balance the need for economies of scale in production with the need to maintain local flexibility and market responsiveness?
The global-matrix firm has simultaneous needs to be global and local, big and small, and centralized and decentralized. Ghoshal and Bartlett argue that the global-matrix structure described above can "embrace" these paradoxes and tensions by internalizing them, but it cannot resolve them. Instead, top management must focus on developing processes within and across the organization that permit a fluid balancing of these tensions. The core organizational processes identified include managerial entrepreneurship, building competencies by developing skills and knowledge and sharing them across the firm, and continuously renewing the firm and its operations.
The integrated health systems developing today resemble the global-matrix firms described above. On the one hand, they have entered into new product markets by integrating backward into insurance (in-house health plans) and ambulatory care (acquired physician practices) or forward into extended care (e.g., home health, nursing homes) (Conrad and Shortell 1996) . On the other hand, they have entered new geographic markets by horizontally integrating multiple hospitals and medical groups operating in different areas or different segments of the same metropolitan market.
The present study argues that a key challenge in such integrated health systems is managing the tensions and conflicts inherent in such structures (Sahney 1996) . Such tensions pervade not only physician-system relationships, but also physician-to-physician and hospital-to-hospital relationships within healthcare systems. This challenge has been labelled "polarity management": managing between dilemmas or extremes (Johnson 1992; Stewart 1996) . Polarities are opposites or contrasts that do not and cannot function well independently of one another. Because of their interdependence, neither side of a polarity can be chosen as a solution when the other side is ignored (Johnson 1992) . Polarity management thus becomes a critical problem-solving skill of navigating between divergent goals and interests that are important to key stakeholders. This study outlines nine types of polarities that exist in physician-to-system, physician-to-physician, and hospital-to-hospital relationships. These polarities are illustrated using ethnographic data gathered from a comparative case analysis of six integrated systems in Illinois (Burns, Egan, and Van Duyne 1997) . The study then outlines the implications of these polarities for administrative practice.
Method Study Background and Sites
This study is based on intensive case analysis of six integrated delivery systems in Illinois conducted in late 1996 and early 1997. The investigation was sponsored jointly by the Illinois Hospital and HealthSystems Association (IHHA) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in Chicago.
Six systems were chosen to ensure representation from Chicago and downstate institutions, teaching and nonteaching systems, and hospital-based and physician clinic-based systems. The six systems were Advocate Health Care, Northwestern Healthcare Network, Rush System for Health, Carle, OSF Healthcare System, and Southern Illinois Healthcare. There is no claim that these systems are representative of all integrated systems in Illinois, or that Illinois systems are representative of systems nationwide. Several of these systems have participated in prior national studies of integration by the HSIS and CHMR projects and have been profiled in case publications (Coddington and Bendrick 1994; Coddington, Chapman and Pokoski 1996) .
Interview Conduct and Protocol
For each site, a team of investigators from the IHHA, IOM, and the Wharton School conducted a series of on-site interviews with key administrative and medical leaders using a standardized interview protocol. Interviews typically lasted one-and-a-half hours each. The interviews inquired into nine process areas of integration between physicians and systems:
1. partnering with physicians; 2. representing physicians in governance; 3. developing physician leaders; 4. harmonizing primary care physician-specialist relationships;
5. sharing risk and reward in business relationships; 6. acquiring physician practices; 7. adopting cost-effective strategies and practices; 8. balancing physician independence with economic security; and 9. adding value to healthcare delivery through integration.
The on-site visits were followed up by additional telephone interviews using the same protocol; active members of the medical staff at each system ensured adequate practitioner representation. On average, 9-10 individuals were interviewed at each system, with an equal mix of executives and physicians. The aggregate findings across all six sites are described elsewhere (Burns, Egan, and Van Duyne 1997) .
Polarity Management: The Key Challenge for Integrated Health Systems.
Physicians
With the exception of Carle, the systems in this study were hospital-based. Many of these hospital systems expressed the desire to become "organizations of physicians," acknowledging that physicians are the key point of attachment with the patient and the enrolled population of covered lives. Given the historic independence and cultural dissimilarities between hospitals and physicians (Shortell 1991; Meyer and Tucker 1992) , this desire represents a leap of faith. This desire is also hindered by unilateral strategic moves made by the systems.
One manifestation of the difficulty of achieving this transition is the fact that the process of integration is initiated by the hospitals and, from the perspective of practicing physicians, controlled by the hospitals. This is often a result of the hospitals' perceived need to move quickly to establish an integrated system around a core set of cooperating institutions. Physicians, who are often not well informed about such initiatives, will be "brought along later on." Such was the tactic adopted elsewhere by Barnes-Jewish-Christian (BJC) Health System in St. Louis. The problem posed by this tactic is that integrating systems want physician buy-in and partnership. For their part, practicing physicians do not fully understand the system's efforts or strategic aims. This lack of understanding is in part a result of the busy office schedules of practitioners (who probably do not have time to read corporate memos or attend meetings) as well as a result of short circuits in the transmission of information from the corporate office to the physician office level. The consequence is that physicians lack the information and participation necessary to build the trust and partnership sought by the system. Another manifestation of the difficulty in transitioning from a hospital system to an organization of physicians is the debate over the appropriate way to integrate physicians. The systems have pursued integration by linking physicians with economic contracting vehicles sponsored by member hospitals, such as a hospital-based PHO or medical staff-based independent practitioner association (IPA). An alternative approach to integration is linking physicians with other physicians. At one institution, a large affiliated physician group has sought to be the acquisition arm for new physicians brought into the system. They view this as consistent with the system's intent to be an organization of physicians in which the system grows by "growing the physician component" (see below). However, group members expressed some concern over the system's acquisition of other group practices. Such concern reflects not only a perceived lack of influence but also the competitive threats posed by new entrants. At another institution, primary care practitioners (PCPs) have formed physician-organized delivery systems (PODS). PODSs are groups of PCPs who virtually organize into risk-bearing networks for capitated business and contract with a select group of specialists with whom they wish to share risk and reward. These PODSs exist independently of the economic contracting vehicles and are often formed by the physicians themselves. There are, nevertheless, ties between the PODS and the system. For example, the leadership of the economic vehicles must come from the PODS, and specialists who wish to contract with the PODS must belong to the specialty panel of the contracting vehicles.
Polarity 2: Expand the System by Growing the Physician Component
Another tension related to the first polarity is the expressed desire of the systems to expand by growing their physician component. The attempts to achieve this growth have proved to be problematic in several respects. First, several systems have focused expansion around the acquisition and growth of large multispecialty groups. Many of these groups have been losing huge amounts of money, an experience that has been common to other physician networks (e.g., Partners Health Care System in Boston). One reason for the financial loss has been the lack of physician productivity and compensation systems. The losses incurred have been subsidized by the acute care hospitals that have been profitable in the past but are being de-emphasized in future planning.
Second, growing physician groups requires capital. Capital is needed for practice acquisitions, information systems that standardize data entry and link group locations, data collection for quality and cost benchmarking, etc. Major tension develops when the system attempts to grow a component in addition to its physician component. In this study several systems sought to simultaneously grow physician groups and health plans, but found that both required substantial capital investments that competed with each another.
Third, at least part of the physician growth strategy is driven by the attempts of competing systems to acquire PCPs and develop their own contracting vehicles. Some systems acquire physicians to prevent competitors from doing so or to guarantee the availability of future referral sources to in-house specialists. Systems therefore invest large amounts of capital in developing integrated physician arrangements that suffer from low productivity and returns (Wall Street Journal 1997) . A dilemma arises over whether the system should lose money on developing integrated structures or lose physicians to competitors who will then lose money on developing integrated structures.
Polarity 3: System Centralization and Physician Decentralization
A third set of tensions arises from the different organizational bases of hospital and physician-office care. It is common knowledge (but still important) that although physicians are being asked to identify with a system, they tend to despise authority and distrust bureaucracies (Goldsmith 1993) . As Shortell (personal communication 1997) has noted, what physician wants to think of himself or herself as fitting into a system? Therefore, although the system may be seeking interdependence, the physician may prefer independence.
Integrated systems tend to include several hospitals with an overarching corporate office from which springs much of the system initiatives. As part of the integration effort, practicing physicians are asked to work with a central corporate office and staff, one with which the physician may not have dealt and perhaps may have never seen. Physicians are also asked to share risk system-wide through system-sponsored contracting vehicles such as super-PHOs. In contrast, physicians tend to concentrate the hospital portion of their practice at one institution. Therefore, they only know the local hospital chief executive officer (CEO) and his/her staff; they also belong to the local hospital-sponsored PHO or other contracting vehicle and share risk with physicians whom they know.
Integrated systems seek to merge two very different types of firms. The hospital-based system is a small number of large institutions; the physician-based system is a large number of small office practices. A merger of the two has proved difficult in system efforts to communicate with physicians and to represent them in governance. Some systems, for example, have thousands of affiliated physicians in offices scattered across a wide geographic area. Communicating with the physicians is no easy matter; neither is adequately representing all constituencies in system-level forums for decision making an easy task. Several systems have abandoned any attempt at such representation and instead use representatives from intermediate-level bodies such as the local contracting vehicles at the hospital.
It is important to note that research on mergers and acquisitions has tended to find a negative association between merger success and the disparity in size of the firms involved (Kitching 1967; Hunt 1990) . That is, mergers are more likely to fail when a large firm acquires a much smaller target firm. Part of this may be a result of the acquiring firm's failure to understand or harness the potential of the target firm in the postacquisition period. Part may be a result of the logistical difficulty of merging activities of firms that operate on entirely different scales with different cultures and operating systems.
Polarity 4: Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces Involving Physicians
Centralizing and decentralizing processes are at work among physicians. On the one hand, centripetal forces seek to more closely bind physicians with the system; on the other hand, centrifugal forces seek to separate physicians from the system. For example, most systems seek to develop a single-signature contracting capability, in which the system can speak for all hospitals and physicians and enter into global capitation agreements. At the same time, physicians (particularly specialists) are developing specialty networks on their own for carve-out capitation. Ironically, systems sometimes support these specialty-oriented efforts by providing assistance with strategic planning or joint-venture capital. System executives do not recognize a contradiction between their efforts to obtain global capitation and specialty carve-out efforts; rather, executives believe a menu approach will work best with the current diversity of payors. They also wish to have a "seat at the table" in dealing with the burgeoning specialty networks.
As another illustration, some systems form system-wide IPAs as a vehicle for payor contracting on a large geographic basis. At the same time, physicians organize their own IPAs at the hospital level to maintain a measure of local autonomy and control. More significantly, physicians in one system have recently organized their own metropolitan-based IPA separately from the system and its hospitals. They have organized this IPA in partial response to the system's failure to win large managed care contracts and to the system's recent downsizing. Group practice formation is a key method used by systems to more closely bind physicians together and with the system. Systems have actively encouraged primary care and other physicians to form groups for several reasons: to represent physicians in governance, to facilitate professional learning, to help foster the desired collaborative culture, to help physicians to accept and manage risk, and to serve as a vehicle for physician recruitment (i.e., groups may be a more attractive partner than the system). To assist group formation, the systems have provided some organizing assistance and startup capital, as well as ongoing leadership training through the Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Ironically, after the groups go through an early maturation process (e.g., how to think and act on their own, how to handle business decisions), they frequently set off in a faster and/or different strategic direction from the system. Groups may pursue their own managed care contracts, decide to become more freestanding and independent of the system, or consider partnering with rival integrated systems. Typically, systems do not try to block these moves but rather seek to support them financially and maintain representation in the group's governance. In one system, executives likened these moves to the actions of wayward children who will someday return home.
In one respect, the systems have engendered this situation by encouraging physician leadership development. Educational programs include training in finance and entrepreneurship. In several systems, entrepreneurial physicians have formed PODS, equity models, and large PCP groups from scratch and taken these groups in new directions. The leadership programs have thus been successful: the systems have trained leaders and not just followers.
Polarity 5: System Objectives and Physician Interests Another dilemma confronting integrating systems concerns the mismatch between system objectives and physician interests. Systems are typically developed to pursue managed care and capitated contracts. System objectives thus focus on winning contracts and assuming responsibility for more covered lives. Physicians, on the other hand, are not as interested in the number of contracts or covered lives that a system has garnered. Instead, they desire more patients and referrals. In many systems, however, there has been a serious delay in gaining capitated contracts and covered lives since payors have shown some reluctance to pass on risk to providers (InterStudy 1997). The result is that, with some exceptions (e.g., Carle and Advocate), these systems are "all dressed up with nowhere to go."
This situation has spawned a number of related dilemmas. First, whatever benefits have been gained from system integration have accrued to the system. These include the development of system-wide information linkages, contracting vehicles, and medical management tools. Benefits of integration for physicians are promised down the road. This scenario is ironic, given the oft-noted distinction in time horizons of the two groups (Shortell 1991) . Thus, executives who have long-term horizons are reaping short-term advantages while physicians with short-term horizons are asked to look long-term.
Second, during the initial years of formation and development, the systems subjected the medical staffs of their member hospitals to considerable change (e.g., the formation of hospital-level and system-level contracting vehicles). Such change has not only disrupted traditional medical staff-hospital relationships but also undermined physician trust and commitment, particularly given the failures to gain large capitated contracts. Systems are thus confronted with the difficult problem of jointly managing large-scale change and physician trust. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that the systems tend to focus on developing contracting vehicles (structures of integration), while rank-and-file physicians stressed the need to emphasize traditional skills in managing physician-hospital relations such as communication and participation.
Third, in their efforts to prepare for capitated contracting, systems are seeking to subject their affiliated and integrated physicians to various managed care measures that will enable them to jointly adapt to market forces. Such measures include system-level and hospital-level care management, capitation management, information systems, and leadership development. At the same time, opposite interests are motivating some physicians to seek integration with the systems. These include the desire to escape managed care and seek protection from market forces. Thus, systems want to assume and manage risk while many physicians wish to avoid risk by selling their practices to the systems.
The disjunction between system objectives to assume and manage risk and physician interests in avoiding risk takes on other manifestations. Consistent with published national data (Ernst & Young 1995) , systems in this study developed contracting vehicles to accept capitated contracts and risk, but the physician members in these vehicles have not financially invested in the vehicles to any significant degree. Similarly, systems have expressed the desire to pursue risk contracts by establishing and growing their physician networks, yet the systems and groups have typically failed to develop the necessary managed care infrastructure within these networks (e.g., physician selection, medical management, contracting specialists, information systems).
Polarity 6: System Centralization and Hospital Decentralization
The tensions generated between systems and physicians are paralleled by tensions between systems and their member hospitals. The systems' raison d'etre is typically to prepare for global capitation and win managed care contracts. Not surprisingly, systems orient their efforts around issues of system welfare such as reducing inpatient hospital use and regionalizing services. System welfare, however, conflicts with the welfare of local hospital operating units. Member hospitals are typically oriented to increasing their own inpatient use and maintaining local services that increase patient access and support physicians' practices.
In a similar vein, systems seek to develop system-level initiatives that demonstrate their value to member institutions. These initiatives include super-PHOs, IPAs,
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Information Integrity and management services organizations (MSOs). At the same time, the system is confronted by member hospitals that have developed their own local initiatives in these areas and have gained some learning curve advantage with them. Consequently, hospitals are not always willing to participate in system-led initiatives. Some systems, particularly those based on loosely coupled, federated models (Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson 1950) , cannot always compel compliance but must seek to build upon the strengths of local institutions. Member hospitals sometimes fear the loss of local control as systems initiate such activities at the central level and may even doubt the system's ability to assume and perform these functions.
Divisions between member institutions also may hinder system-led efforts to act in unison. For example, consistent with national trends (Luke, Ozcan, and Olden 1995) , most systems in this study are locally organized in the same metropolitan market. Oftentimes these systems combine hospitals that historically have been rivals over patient bases, referrals, teaching programs, medical staff composition, culture, etc. The system office asks hospitals that were once fierce competitors to collaborate and cooperate. Problems appear when hospitals are asked to sign system-level contracts with payors. Although single-signature contracting is the goal, medical staffs of member hospitals are not necessarily willing to share risk with medical staffs elsewhere that they distrust or look down upon. A reluctance to share with other hospitals one's own financial surpluses and, in effect, to subsidize them also exists. Hospitals that have been used to getting high prices in their contracts are concerned that a super-PHO contract will negotiate a lower, standardized rate that reduces their profit margin. Across the six study sites, those systems that lacked a common bottom line linking all member hospitals typically encountered strong resistance to regionalizing services and sharing resources.
A final source of division between the system and its members lies in the fact that, despite their common location in a single market, member hospitals occupied very different environments for managed care contracting. Some hospitals were situated in areas with very high managed care penetration and thus had well-established contracting vehicles to deal with payors. Other hospitals resided in areas with low managed care penetration, enjoyed considerably more commercially insured business, and had not really embarked on a concerted strategy to deal with payors. Systems commonly found it difficult to act as systems and engage in single-signature contracting when members were not on the same page of managed care preparedness.
Polarity 7: PCPs and Specialists
Primary care physicians and specialists have traditionally clashed over such issues as communication and return of patients. Integrated healthcare has exacerbated many of these conflicts in acute ways. The physicians who are typically more "integrated" with the system as gauged by ownership or practice acquisition are the PCPs. The nonintegrated specialists view the development of contracting vehicles (often headed by PCPs) and PCP networks with two concerns: (1) that many specialists will be excluded from the specialty panels with which these vehicles and networks deal, and (2) that many specialists will suffer a drop in referrals.
Compounding these fears is that the PCPs are increasingly viewed (by both the system and the specialists) as the "favorite son," effectively usurping the role that specialists once enjoyed. PCPs are now viewed as the key to the system's future success by virtue of their ability to provide primary care for a large population of covered lives. Specialists, however, are keenly aware that they have been largely responsible for the past financial success of the system and have provided the revenues used by the system to build the PCP base. Many of the PCP groups now forming in these systems are developing their own specialty and ancillary services, all of which threaten the economic livelihood of specialists on the hospital medical staff. Consequently, PCPs are becoming the "distrusted son" in the eyes of specialists. Such diminution of trust is reportedly inhibiting referrals and collaboration between the two sets of physicians. In addition to the economic reversal of fortune, there is a political upheaval among PCPs and specialists. The emerging medical leadership in many integrated systems are the PCPs who (by stipulation in some cases) must be represented in disproportionate numbers in the governance of the managed care contracting vehicles. Moreover, the leaders of the hospital-level PHOs are typically PCPs and not specialists. These developments are in sharp contrast to traditional medical staff leadership, which has been specialist dominated and controlled.
Polarity 8: Physician Autonomy via Collectivization
One of the key dilemmas investigated during this study is how physicians seek to balance their traditional independence and professional autonomy with the growing need for economic security in the face of managed care pressures. Physician perceptions about balancing autonomy and security varied considerably by physician type. Solo practitioners had, by definition, avoided group practices, integrated arrangements, and employment. For them, professional independence seemed paramount, although they expressed concerns over their incomes. Employed physicians (primarily PCPs) tended to report that they had not lost clinical autonomy over referrals or 
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Information Integrity prescribing patterns, but that they had lost control over the functioning and administration of their offices (e.g., staffing and purchasing decisions). Specialists, on the other hand, believed that they were losing both autonomy and security, particularly with the development of PCP-based contracting vehicles that might reduce the size of the panel of specialists with which they contract.
In several systems, a primary means used to jointly ensure autonomy and security was through "collectivization" of physicians by physicians. In essence, physicians sacrificed their individual autonomy to achieve collective autonomy, economic power, and security. Such collectives included the formation of large physician groups, multi-specialty clinics, economic contracting vehicles, or PODs. Most of these collectives were organized and administered by the physicians themselves. The large size increased physicians' visibility, importance, and leverage in the system. In this manner, physicians hoped to achieve greater "equilibrium" in negotiations with the hospital system and large managed care payors.
Collectivization brought several immediate benefits to organized physicians that were not enjoyed by freestanding practitioners. First, physician collectives were more likely to have a voice in system governance by virtue of having designated board seats for large physician groups or contracting vehicles. Second, physician collectives were more likely to receive strategic planning and financial assistance from the system to develop their networks. Collectivization also brought benefits to the systems by serving as a competitive spur to unorganized physicians throughout the system to follow their lead.
Polarity 9: Vertical and Virtual Integration A major debate in the field of integrated healthcare is whether firms should vertically integrate via ownership or virtually integrate via contracting (Goldsmith 1994; Conrad and Shortell 1996; Walston, Kimberly, and Burns 1996) . The systems studied here did not view this as an either/or issue but rather as a delicate balancing act between both.
As noted in recent studies of integrated systems (Dynan, Bazzoli, and Burns 1998; Zuckerman et al. 1998) , systems typically offer their physicians a menu of integration options from which to choose, depending on the stage of their career, their specialty, and their preferences for loose or tight coupling. Physicians who wish to maintain their independence can select the IPA or PHO option; those who desire closer economic integration can select the MSO, equity model, or salaried practice model.
In addition, physicians exhibit mobility across these integration options as their needs change and as they gain experience with a given option. Over time, some physicians transition from loosely coupled to tightly coupled arrangements; others move out of tightly integrated arrangements to looser forms of integration. Similar processes occur at the group level. In one system, an owned physician group decided to become freestanding while a freestanding physician group decided it wished to be acquired. The same system also pursued both ownership of groups and investorship in groups. The system believed that its equity position provided the system with a seat at the physician group's governance table and provided the basis for future partnerships.
One key dilemma for many systems was the make-or-buy decision regarding health plans. Several systems (and some of their acquired groups) had developed their own health plans but experienced conflict in managing them alongside the other integration components. As mentioned earlier, the health plans competed with aligned physician groups for financial resources and development. Moreover, the inhouse health plans were too small to generate enough patients and market share, and potentially antagonized the other payors with which the systems contracted. In many systems, the health plans were sold to external payors that provided an influx of cash to support additional physician network expansion. In other systems, however, the health plans were not only retained but emphasized in the system's growth strategy. In such instances, coordinated strategic planning was facilitated by overlapping governance across the system's medical clinic, hospital(s), and health plan. Alignment of financial incentives was achieved by means of single-asset ownership of all integration components.
Implications of Polarity Management
The analysis here suggests that these polarities are interdependent rather than mutually exclusive. That is, they are appropriately viewed as crosscutting axes (90-degree angle) rather than opposite ends of a continuum (180-degree angle). Viewed from this perspective, the role of management becomes a balancing of the rival perspectives. On the one hand, managers must pursue the system's interest in increasing alignment and inclusion of physicians; on the other hand, managers must accommodate the physicians' interests in empowerment, local control, and self-determination.
Polarity management may involve more than balancing perspectives, however. It may entail pursuing both directions simultaneously. Similar findings have been presented in empirical studies on leadership: should leaders display theory X behaviors, theory Y behaviors, or both (Blake and Mouton 1964; Misumi and Peterson 1985) .
Similar conclusions have also been reached in qualitative studies of successful companies (Peters and Waterman 1982) . One of the eight characteristics of these excellent firms was "simultaneous loose-tight properties." The companies were tightly structured in terms of strongly held values that disciplined and controlled the behavior of all employees. However, because employees were expected to adhere to the values, there was less need for overt supervision. This yielded a loosely structured environment that permitted autonomy, flexibility, and experimentation. The organization therefore built theory X and theory Y into its architecture and values.
A more recent study of visionary companies likewise explains their success in terms of their ability to (1) avoid the tyranny of the "or" and (2) embrace the genius of the "and" (Collins and Porras 1994) . Such companies found it easier to live with paradoxes and seemingly contradictory ideas at the same time. They sought to achieve both sides of a polarity simultaneously, such as achieving high performance in both the short run and the long run, or preserving core values while stimulating radical change.
The essence of leadership--from the perspective of polarity management--thus becomes managing ambiguities and multiple directions. Confronting these seemingly contradictory ideas provides a fruitful method to sort out confusions regarding the organization's direction and to create meaning for the organization's participants. It can also serve to promote organizational learning in dynamic external environments and diverse internal environments. For example, by articulating the existence and nature of the polarities mentioned above, executives and physicians can begin to explore both sides of dilemmas as a means to overcome resistance to change.
What Is the Glue?
Given the multiple polarities that exist in integrated health systems and the diversity of interests to be accommodated, what is the glue that holds these systems together? Three cohesive forces were present in the six Illinois sites: standardization, interpenetration, and culture.
Standardization. The HSIS identified three types of integration (functional, physician, and clinical) in their study of hospital systems. Common to each type was the notion of "pooled interdependence" (Thompson 1967; Hrebiniak 1994) : each hospital in the system featured the same integrative elements. For example, clinical integration meant that system hospitals would share the same clinical protocols, medical record elements, outcomes data, support services, etc. In essence, regardless of the type of integration, activities were conducted in a like manner in each hospital.
Standardization also served as a major cohesive force in this study. As in the HSIS, one set of elements to be standardized concerned clinical care practices such as guidelines and care maps. Clinical activities were also standardized using a common managed care infrastructure. In one system, all of the economic contracting vehicles shared the same utilization management tools and administrative committees; at the same time, all of the group practice sites shared the same administrative and clinical systems. Likewise, other systems sought to standardize clinical functions by means of system-wide information systems and patient records, or MSOs that could standardize physician back-office functions.
Systems with educational missions also relied on common teaching programs across hospitals to provide a unifying force, oftentimes allowing one hospital with a demonstrated capability in a given clinical area to develop the system-wide educational, clinical, and research focus for other hospitals. These same systems also used clinical institutes of excellence and system-wide research programs to unite the various members in pursuit of common research and educational objectives.
Finally, one system sought to standardize competencies across its member hospitals. These competencies included contracting management, care management, and capitation management. The system developed a super-PHO to standardize managed care contracting functions (and thus contracts) across the hospital-based PHOs. In this manner, the system presented a unified face to the customer. With regard to care management, the system instituted a medical directors' council to standardize referrals across PHOs, fee schedules, and guidelines. Finally, the system established a super-MSO to standardize capitation management skills.
Interpenetration. Global firms such as ABB seek to develop patterns of interdependence and interpenetration among its numerous operating companies by several means. These include the use of a matrix structure whereby operating company presidents report to both a product leader and a geographic area leader, in effect forcing the two sets of leaders to continually balance the needs for standardization and localization. In a similar fashion, several of the systems in this study used matrix arrangements to interweave the interests of interdependent activities: products/clinical areas, hospital markets, and operating functions.
For example, one system developed a matrix of strategic business functions and local hospital market operations. Specific hospital CEOs (with responsibility for local markets) were given additional responsibility for system-wide operating functions such as physician development, managed care, quality, continuum of care, information technology, etc. The ultimate aim was to base a portion of the CEO's compensation on the performance of the corporate-level function, which would require hospital CEOs to cooperate with one another to achieve their corporate targets. Another system developed a matrix of local market operations and key customers. Specific directors of contracting vehicles (e.g., PHOs) at the hospital level were jointly responsible for key HMO payors system-wide. A third system developed a matrix of local market operations and product lines. Regional medical directors were made jointly responsible for the standardization of clinical products across the system.
Interpenetration was achieved in other systems without the specific use of matrix arrangements. For example, in one system a large medical group provided the single largest block of admissions to the system hospital, while the hospital served as the primary locus of inpatient practice, capital, and medical education for the group. There was also a dense network of contracts and financial relationships between the two entities. In another integrated system the major organizational components (medical group, hospital, and health plan) had overlapping medical leadership and governing boards to permit unified planning.
Organizational Culture. While the different systems had different cultures, the presence of a common culture within each system served to bind the various components together. In systems with major teaching programs, the educational and research mission served as the cohesive force (e.g., collaborative research projects across institutions, joint pursuit of residency program objectives). In systems with religious foundations, the faith mission and ministry linkage provided a set of guiding values that, in some cases, were inculcated in physician leaders during formal orientation sessions. In systems with for-profit components, the for-profit orientation and the equity stake available to physicians served as a cohesive force.
Summary
There is no evidence as of yet regarding how well these cohesive forces work to unite the systems. The integration efforts depicted here are, with one exception, less than 10 years old. Efforts aimed at improving cohesion are even more recent. This lack of history and development makes it difficult to observe integration outcomes, let alone evaluate them. It may be prudent for executives and fruitful for researchers to focus instead on the processes of integration that may influence such outcomes. This analysis suggests that processes such as polarity management represent a key administrative challenge that integrated systems must address to demonstrate their potential.
PRACTITIONER RESPONSE Robert K. Kuramoto, M.D., Assistant Medical Director, Christie Clinic, Champaign, IL With the current healthcare literature filled with countless best-practice templates, it is always refreshing to discover a new and more relevant perspective on integrating health systems. This study not only identifies the real-life challenges to collaboration in the context of a business parallel, but suggests a practical tool for a win-win resolution, one rarely used in the healthcare arena. Anyone who has a strategic planning, governance, or managerial role in a health system will benefit from the message of this article. This information is not only beneficial to merging entities, but will be invaluable internally for all healthcare organizations attempting to create meaningful relationships among their providers.
Three important concepts are presented by Dr. Burns. First, the process, not the structural basis, of integration is the pivotal issue on which he concentrates. Focusing on the processes can become the glue of the new organization. Second, the nine polarities identified in this research are not unique to the six Illinois case study sites. Many hospitals and systems face similar challenges. Third, managing these polarities to achieve the best outcome requires a fundamentally different philosophy and strategy than is normally implemented.
Over recent years, almost every healthcare entity has searched for a best-practice model and structure to help integrate its physicians and hospital systems into a strategic market force. We attempt to cut and paste parts and pieces of those outwardly attractive models (via countless pricey newsletters and sunny resort meetings) to our own environments. But even the best and most methodic planning for a seamless integrated health delivery system has met with less than expected results, not only as viewed by the market, but even by the systems themselves. Few organizations can boast of achieving economies of scale, improving provider satisfaction, or accomplishing true postmerger cohesiveness, let alone of increasing value to the patients. The adaption of structural parameters alone is not enough to ward off impending pitfalls on the way to constructing a synergistic system. Dr. Burns's research on six different systems exposes the basic conflicts of culture and philosophy that both hinder further cooperation and potentially even erode present relationships.
Physicians, hospital executives, and board members will readily recognize the challenges presented in this paper. Although the players and specific issues may differ, common themes parallel their local struggles. Metropolitan, rural, academic, for-profit, and not-for-profit organizations all share the frustration of being unable to resolve these issues in a win-win manner.
Why do all systems have similar polarities? Polarities result from a pool of predictable incompatibilities. First, healthcare is fundamentally local, but competition and market share incentives have pushed the industry into being more regional. The government's antitrust police have ingrained in our minds that too-neighborly collaboration is unhealthy. It is little wonder that disharmony prevails in these arranged marriages that force previously independent competitors together into less than collegial situations that also require allegiance to a new central system administration. Second, the relationships of physicians and hospitals, with their traditional independent contractor and workplace concept, are unlike other businesses. Although the governance system in healthcare provider entities may resemble systems in the corporate world, the reality is that physicians and their organizations still think and work independently. Governance is weak and thus frequently challenged. Despite good arguments for interdependence,
